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TOWARDS A STRUCTURAL VIEW OF RESILIENCE
William Clark, C.S. Holling, D.O. Jones
The notes which follow were put together to serve as
background material for the IIASA Workshop on Hypotheticality,
Resilience and Option foreclosure. A familiarity with the
papers of Holling (1973) and Holling and Clark (1974) is pre-
sumed.
The result of resilience is persistence: the maintenance
of certain characteristic behavioral properties in the face
of stress, strain and surprise. But the origins of this re-
silient ｾ ･ ｨ ｡ ｶ ｩ ｯ ｲ lie in the structure of the systems which
concern us. Our need as policy analysists may only be one of
comparative measures: Which system is more resilient? But
as active designers - as engineers, managers, or responsible
policy advisors - we need to be able to say what mechanisms
or relationships make a system resilient, and what actions we
can take to make it more or less so.
This need for a causal view of resilience led us to a
search for persistence-promoting (or II res ilient") mechanisms
and relationships in a variety of natural and man-made systems.
Three general and inclusive classes of such mechanisms
emerged from our studies. We have, somewhat optimistically,
labeled these emergent classes the "Components of Resilience".
In the pages which follow we describe these components, first
at an abstract ｯ ｶ ･ ｲ ｶ ｾ ･ ｷ level, and then in some detail through
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reference to particular examples.
A few prefatory comments are ｩ ｮ Ｎ ｾ ｲ ､ ･ ｲ Ｌ however. First
and foremost, ..our classification of components is in no way
unique. The cited examples could doubtlessly be grouped in
several other ways. We have provisionally adopted the present
classification because of its attractiveness from a design
(or, alternatively, a natural selection) point of view.
At present the classification scheme still tends to ring
a bit hollow if looked at too closely. A disconcerting number
of our empirical mechanism examples could plausibly be placed
in more than one of the proposed component classes. Our in-
tuitive feeling is that the ambiguities, though troublesoms,
are less serious than they might at first appear. The reason
is that we have little interest in the classificatory scheme
per see We are interested in it primarily as a tool to help
in the articulation and understanding of alternative resilient
policy designs. This is not ,the place to detail their usaJe
in that context, but the general intent is that they be employed
as a criterion axis in a version of the so-called "morphological"
approach to alternative policy articulation (MacCrimrnon 1975).
The important clients for the components notions are not
taxonomists and librarians, but rather engineers. Although
we are"hardly insensitive to the desirability of conceptual
elegance and clarity for its own sake, our primary criterion
of utility remains a practical rather than esthetic one. The
critical question we pose to readers of this note is whether
these are types of persistence promoting mechanisms excluded
-3-
from the present scheme or, somewhat less seriously, whether
any of the proposed classes could be decomposed further in
a useful and relatively unambiguous manner.
We do not yet understand the resilience components ideas
clearly enought to pose them in a single comprehensive and in-
tegrated package. Instead, we must rely on presenting a series
of alternative views hoping that the important and central
concept of Resilience Components will emerge from or, perhaps
better, survive, the different perspectives.
We begin at the end, with a set of proposed definitions.
These are followed by a trivial example contrived to introduce
in an impressionistic way the three resilience components.
This is provided for the sake of overview only and we would ask
you to imagine while reading it that there may be more there
than meets the eye Our second pass at the Components
concept is adapted from a draft report of our ecological work
on the subject. The presentation is highly abstract and tied
to the technical ecological literature but represents the
area of our most detailed and critical studies on the subject.
To be fair, however, the reader might best consider that there
is likely to be a bit less here than meets the eye. Finally,
we discuss a few of the examples from outside the ecological
literature which have thrown light upon the Components analysis.
A) Formal Definitions of the Resilience' Components
We define three Components of Resilience. The Class I
or Boundary Component includes mechanisms which give the part
of the system which has been perturbed an ability to recover
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without any contribution from nonperturbed areas. These are
generally state-dependent, negative feedback management rules
or control mechanisms. The Class II or ｒ ･ ｳ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ Component
concerns (a) the existence of unperturbed parts of the system,
and (b) the ability of those unperturbed parts to contribute
to the recovery of perturbed parts. Relevant mechanisms enforce
or induce heterogeneity of the system, establish reserves of
uncommitted resources or insurance, and allow for the real-
location of resources among the heterogeneous units. The Class
III or Contingency Component considers the degree of dependence
of a system's resilient properties on aspects of the environ-
ment beyond its immediate influence. Mechanisms here deal with
provision of diverse sources for necessary resources, and with
reducing sensitivity to single factors or elements of the system.
B) Resilient Components in the Food Retail· Business - A Contrived
Imagine yourself as the manager of a medium sized Nortrl
American food store. Your short-term goal is to make a profit
by keeping the amount of food in stock and the number of
customers waiting for checkout within reasonable limits despite
fluctuations in deliveries and buying behavior (1) • We will
consider the effects of the following relationships (rules,
(l)It is assUmed:that too large an inventory results in spoilage
and high storage costs; too low an inventory results in empty
shelves and ·perh-a·ps irreversible loss of customers; too slow
a rate of check-out also results in customer dissatisfaction;
and too high a rate of check-out implies uneconomic over invest-
ment in cashiers.
(2)
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mechanisms) on your ability to achieve that goal:
(a) Your internal operating procedures,
(b) Your possible links with other food stores, and
(c) Your relationships with food supplies, labor markets
and consumer demand.
Your first line of defense against an uncertain world is
an effective inventory and personnel control system. You
will set up standard operating procedures through which present
shelf stocks trigger deliveries from 'the back room', and total
inventory governs orders from your wholesaler.
Both sets of stock control rules will doubtlessly have
factors built-in to account for known daily, weekly and seasonal
buying patterns of consumers. Similarly, rules will be devised
to switch a certain number of stock-boys into check-out bagging
operations when lines begin to grow. Both inventory and
personnel regulation procedures will incorporate sufficient
slack to accommodate surprises: inflated inventories to buffer
late deliveries, extra or multiply-trained employees to antici-
pate absence and illness. We define this class of management
mechanisms (rules, relationships) as the ｂ ｯ ｵ ｮ ､ ｡ ｲ ｾ (or Class I)
ｾ ｯ ｮ ･ ｮ ｴ of Resilience. Their key characteristic is that
they include only those "in-house" procedures which are keyed
to your local conditions (inventory and line sizes) and utilize
authority, control, and resources which are normally available
as part of your local (i.e. in-store) operations. Sales, early
closing hours, orders to wholesaler's, (2) and job allocation to
employees all corne under this category.
Temporarily considered as a passive entity reacting to your
purchase orders.
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Whatever internal inventory and personnel controls you
adopt, however, they cannot protect you from all of the nasty
tricks which fate may hold in store. Consider the impact of a
case of scarlet fever in a clerk which quarantines a third of
your staff. Or an ordering error which results in the delivery
of 100 instead of 1 case of ripe avocadoes. Or a major break-
down of your "back-room" cold storage facilities. No internal
adaptations will help you stay within your limits here. The
only real hope is that there is some accessible external source
of trained personnel, of avocado outlet, of cold-storage space
which is sUfficiently independent of your own operation that it
is unaffected by your scariet fever, bookkeeper and mechanics.
Such exogenous, (your) state-independent mechanisms for coping
with stress and disaster are characteristic of what we have
called the Restorative (or Class II) Component of Resilience
Several specific mechanisms are imaginable in the present
context, but the most likely is a net of similar food retail
stores, each committed to helping the other in times of stress.
To the extent that they are decentralized with respect to loca-
tion and administration it is highly unlikely that disasters of
the sort we have been discussing will affect more than one or
a few members of the net at once, leaving the others undisturbed
and able to spare resources to effect their brother's recovery.
Various sorts of insurance are another example (3) •
(3) There are, of course, disasters which will affect all of the
units simultaneously and render many of the Restorative Resilience
aspects of their relationship a moot point. Consider large union
strikes or national crop shortages in this context. Certain types
of insurance schemes would remain meaningful here precisely to the
extent that the food store business representsd a small segment of
their total clientele. Disasters in their food store accounts could
then be absorbed via Class ｉ ｾ ｉ (below).
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Finally, we come to a consideration of the linkages and
dependencies of your store on various aspects of its external
environment. We have touched on this in a passive way in
considering the impact of, for example, delivery failures. But
let us now take a more active stance: How, as a conscientious
manager, should I structure my relationships with those
aspects of the external environment on which I depend but which
I cannot control? This is the problem to be dealt with by the
Contingency (or Class III) Component of Resilience. An obvious
concern in this respect is my relationship with my supplies of
food. If I deal with a single wholesaler and am only one of
his clients, I am relatively helpless before his changes of
prices, supply schedules and so forth. I can clearly make my
situation less tenuous by diversifying my sources of supply
so that no one supplier's behavior can strongly effect my
ability to achieve my management goals(4).
A similar situation is faced with regard to labor supply.
Again my worst case is encountered when I must buy all my
labor from a single monopolist (union) whose behavior I cannot
influence. An extreme response analogous to the purchase of
suppliers noted above consists of buying ownership of all
labor the company town solution (5) • The intermediate and
(4) Alternatively, I can change the rules of the ｧ ｡ ｾ ･ by buying
control of all my suppliers so that they become part ｾ ｦ my
locally determined operations and subject to Class I Component
adaptations.
(5) This may be nonresilient for other reasons, the most obvious
being its negation of Class II concepts.
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probably most generally "resilient" response from the manager's
perspective in the case of supplies is an essentially "free
market" one in which there are multiple independent sources
of the desired ｧ ｏ ｏ ､ Ｈ Ｖ Ｉ ｾ A final example of a Class III ｒ ･ ｳ ｩ ｬ ｾ
ience Component would be represented by a decision to reduce
dependence on the public power grid by installation of generators
in the store for emergency usage.
C) ｾｯｮ･ｮｴｳ of Resilience in Ecosystems
Ecological studies have emphasized the idea of resilience
as a key to the conceptual organization and synthesis of
perturbed ecosystem studies. This viewpoint has beem more fully
articulated in Holling (1973). It had been clear since the
beginning of our work, however, that these initial concepts
would have to be further developed if they were to provide a
solid, unambiguous framework for the study and analysis of
disturbed ecosystem behavior. In particular, at the stage of
our research summarized in Holling (1973), we felt that we had
good quantitative handles on resilience only for the simple
case of a closed, homogenous, deterministic system. The importance
of "open" system effects, of spatial and temporal heterogeneity,
and of random or irregular events was recognized, but understood
only hazily and at a most uncomfortably qualitative level.
Yet our revielt of the literature on "stability" properties
of disturbed ecosystems made it clear that these latter factors
(6) This is not to suggest that equilibrium free-market ｳ ｙ ｇ ｾ ｾ ｭ ｳ
are bound to be resilent. As pointed out by Cyert and Marsh (1963)
(see below), the equilibrium solution is generally characterized
by zero "slack" and is thus highly unresilient.
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would have to be dEalt with explicitly in any really satisfactory
conceptual framework. A significant part of our work over the
past year has consequently addressed the problem of refining the
basic resilience concept. Dre.,;'ring on. the E::::"st:Utg str.bilit:;
literature, relevant theory, and our own sinulation models, we
have made some progress in articulating three qualitatively
distinct but inclusive Components of Resilience. We believe that,
when fully developed, these will be sufficient to encompass and
relate all presently known factors affecting the response of
ecosystems to stress. The components are summarily described
below, with a more formal and rigorous treatment to be provided
in a manuscript now in preparation (Clark, Holling & Jones in
prep.). We emphasize that these results are tentative and
anticipate many refinements to emerge from interactions with
other Project Groups in the coming year. The following treatment is
designed to. indicate the directions of our work, not its con-
clusions.
Boundary Resilience
"Resilience" may be seen as a behavioral property of an
ecosystem: its ability to absorb or "bounce back" from pertur-
bations. The property of resilience derives from structural
characteristics or adaptations of the ecosystem. It is these
structural characteristics -- the "sources" of resilience --
that we have classified into Resilience Components. We distinguish
ｴ ｨ ｾ ･ ･ such Components -- Boundary Resilience, Restorative
Resilience, and Contingency Resilience -- which may be most
succinctly characterized in simple abstract terms.
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Figure 1 shows our initial concept of resilience, inter-
preted in terms of state space behavior of two interacting
populations. The subsequent behavior of the two populations
density Y Figure 1
o density X
(arrows) is defined by their present state, or location, in
the space. Boundary conditions arise in natural systems such
that populations (A) presently within those boundaries (shaded
area) tend to remain within them ("stability") while populations
(B) outside the boundaries (unshaded) do not, in this case
going to zero density and extinction. External perturbations which
move the populations from inside the shaded region to outside
(0 ｾ ｃ Ｇ Ｉ Ｌ can change future behavior, making a previously "stable"
system go extinct. ｐ ･ ｲ ｴ ｵ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｳ which do not result in boundaries
being crossed Ｈ ｄ ｾ ｄ Ｇ Ｉ Ｌ do not result in such changes in persistence.
All of this is detailed in Holling (1973).
t"Je now know from our own theoretical work and analysis of
data-rich simulation models that the location and configuration
of the boundary in Figure I -- and thus certain aspects of the
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resilience properties and perturbation response of the system --
are altered in definite and predictable ways by changes in the
population parameters (growth rates, reproductive rates, pre-
dation rates, etc.) and structure (genetic diversity, pheno-
typic polYmorphism, age class composition) of X and Y (Jones,
1974 ｡ Ｌ ｢ ｾ Walters 1974). Most classical stability theory (e.g.
May 1973), predation efficiency arguments (e.g. Rosenzweig and
MacArthur 1963), studies of refuges and minimwu grazing
densities (Parsons Ｑ Ｙ Ｗ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ work on high-density emigration and
notions of the adaptive function of po1ymorphisms and ｧ ･ ｮ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣
variability in fluctuating environments are most readily inter-
preted as dealing with the same issue: How do state (density)
dependent relationships within and between the populations
determine their resilience/stability behavior in the face of
perturbations?
This question -- or class of questions was the focal
point of our initial resilience concept and is now being further
developed as the important "Boundary" Component of overall resilience.
Restorative Resilience
Refer again nm"l to Figure 1. However strong the boundary
forces in a system, external perturbations (violent weather
effects, physical trauma, management) will occasionally move
the system outside of its stable (shaded) region, as in ｃ ｾ ｾ ｃ Ｇ Ｎ
If this were really a one-way, irreversible sort of event, very
soon no system would be left inside its stable region. State
dependent phenomena cannot, by definition, ever move the system
from C' __ ｾｃＮ But state-independent phenomena can and do, and
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it is these which we have termed the Restoxative Component of
overall resilience.
The crucial thing to recognize at this point is that the
phenomena depicted in Figure I and addressed in all the pre-
viously cited literature are in both a formal and intuitive
sense essentially "local" and "continuous" in char2cter. They
are appropriate for situations in which everyone we are con-
cerned with in the various populations is bumping into everyone
else according to some well-specified set of rules; in which
our state tomorrow is always a function of our state today.
Our system must not be so big that what is happening between
X and Y on one side of the field is different from, or not
closely related to, what is happening on the other. Similarly,
we must not get into situations where today's state has less
to do with yesterday's than with some other factor which
determines our present condition largely independent of what
it has been in the ｲ ｾ ｣ ･ ｮ ｴ past. Vie,,,,,ed in another uay, these
early descriptions apply rigorously only where the entire
"system" under consideration is perturbed homogeneously and
simultaneously.
Yet it is very clear that the perturbation behavior and
resilience properties of most natural systems are critically
dependent on just the sorts of temporal and spatial discon-
tinuities ignored in Boundary Component considerations. The
classic "density-independent factors"line of argument and
evidence applies here, particularly as it pertains to ｾ ･ ｡ ｴ ｨ ･ ｲ
as an influence \tfhich temporarily overrides the temporal s"ta"te
dependence of system behavior. This material is well enough
- 13 -
established that we shall not comment further on it in this
interim ｲ ･ ｶ ｩ ･ ｾ Ｑ Ｎ
We feel we have made some useful and oLiginal progress
,beyond providing a home for density-independent arguments,
however. In our present working hypothesis, we view the growing
evidence on "stability" effects of spatial heterogeneity and
dispersal as part of the same largely state-independent,
Restorative Resilience parcel. Briefly, the argument is as follows.
The fact that the world is not spatially homogeneous means
that although a perturbation may have pushed one local group
of X and Y out of its stable region from ｃ ｾ ｃ Ｇ Ｌ other local
groups of the same species may still be happily functioning
within their stable regions. The perturbation may have missed
them altogether, or have been less strong, or affected them
differently. Now, if there is no exchange between these hetero-
geneous groups, the one perturbed to C' will, in our present
example, proceed on to ･ ｊ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ (What happens then we l'Yill
discuss under Contingency Resilience). But if there is exchange
for instance, if the unperturbed groups are occasionally sending
out emigrants in line with previous ｂ ｯ ｵ ｮ ､ ｡ ｾ ｹ Resilience argu-
ments -- then there is some chance that the perturbed system
will be "reperturbed" from C' (or wherever it has gotten to)
back into the stable region by receiving a suitable dose of
immigrants from the outside world. Note that the dose of immigrants
received can be viewed as essentially independent of the state
or densities of the originally perturbed site. (The number of
immigrants '''ho "take" on the new site is doubtless no):
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independent of local conditions. This matter is being addressed
in the context of our present research and we shall contend
with it in the forthcoming detailed version of our Resilience
framework) •
If we are concerned with the perturbation response and
resilience properties of the entire system, rather than parti-
cular local subunits, then our conceptual overview clearly must
cope with dispersal and spatial heterogeneity as they function
to provide an internal Restorative Resilience to the system.
This Restorative Resilience provides a mechanism which "allows"
the overall system to correct or compensate for local errors,
mistakes, or perturbations, rather than "letting" such events
accumulate or spread and cripple the entire system. Such a
mechanism would seem, a priori,a necessary attribute of any
persistent system functioning in an uncertain environment.
We have yet to work out the formal niceties of Restorative
Resilience to the extent we have done for Boundary Resilience.
This is one major project for the coming year (see Jones,1974b).
Preliminary analyses of existing studies on the relationships
between heterogeneity, dispersal and persistance (cf. work of
Huffaker, Paine, Kennedy and Southwood and our own budworm
studies) seem to fit with our presnet concept, however. In
addition, we are exploring the potential conceptual foundation
proposed by MacArthur (1972) in his "island view of competition".
Contingency Resilience
In our discussion of Boundary Resilience, we were concerned
with perturbation behavior of the system inside and up to its
- 15 -
stability boundaries. Restorative Resilience dealt with IOCQl
possibilities of getting back into the stable region once per-
turbed out of it. For Contingency Resilience, ",re must take
this progression one step further and contend with the matter
of local extinction.
Consider a several (e.g. "k") species equivalent of the
system represented in Figure I and assume that a local pertur-
bation has pushed one of the component species (i) not just
out of its stability region but, in this particular locality,
completely to extinction. Once again, if this is a one-way
phenomenon, every species will sooner or later become extinct
at all localities. Now, if local extinction of species (i)
results in no other substantial changes to the local system,
we can vie\"l the e:ctinction-recolonization problem as a
Restorative Resilience one. For the local system to be restored
to its full "k" species complement after the perturbation it
is merely necessary to borrow some emigrant species (i) from
adjoining local areas where their extinction has not occurred
and disperse them into our perturbed site.
But,as we know, the local extinction of species (i) will
often result in quite substantial changes in the remaining lIi ll -Iess
community. Paine's "keystone species" perturbations provide an
obvious if extreme example. Obligate predators of (i) will
follow it to extinction, competitive exclusion initially blocked
through (i's) feeding behavior may occur, habitat alteration
may follow, and so on. In cases such as this, the potential
emigrant (i's) from adjoining unperturbed areas may well find
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it impossible to recolonize the perturbed site, at least until
and unless simultaneous arrival of the other Ｂ ｬ ｯ ｳ ｾ Ｂ species
occurs as well. The local extinction may therefore be essentially
permanent or of a sufficiently long duration to permit various
natural succession activities to "prepare ll the pert.urbed site
for eventual successful recolonization. Clearly, the longer
this lag or recovery period, the better the chance that all
local populations will go extinct through perturbations before
any of the sites can be recolonized. This case is presented
formally in
--- ｾ
Figure 2
(A) is a standard X-Y bounded equilibrium. But there exists
an equilibrium (B) in which X is ｰ ｯ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ･ and Y is zero (say
X is a grazer at carrying capacity); (C) is a similar point,
for a higher equilibrium X. Now assume the X-Y system has been
perturbed out of its region (A) and settled to (B) with Y
locally extinct. Class II can replenish Y, but only in the
strictly vertical dimension. Y's Class II cannot bring about
any X dimension change. From the ･ ｱ ｵ ｩ ｬ ｩ ｢ ｲ ｟ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ Ｈ ｾ ｬ Ｎ ｾ ｾ ｩ ｟ ｳ Ｎ ｣ ｬ ･ ｑ ｾ _
that a Class II Ｇ ｣ Ｌ Ｎ ｾ :s AY :s Q will put the system back in region (A).
But from an equilibrium (C), no Clas's 116Y can move the system
into '(A). Only a coordinated Class II AX and Class II bY of
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appropriate magnitudes will result in reinstating the system
in region (A). If the points (B), (C) are viewed as probability
distributions rather than constants the argument fits well with
the generation of resilience number values for various con-
figurations of the XY state space. Class III resilience for
Y here seems not only conditional on the e'ristence of X but
on the particular relations between X, Y shown by the state
space.
What we are talking about here, in a formal sense, is the
similarity of adjacent stable regions in the ｭ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｾ ｳ ｰ ･ ｣ ｩ ･ ｳ state
space. If we remove species (i) from a previously persistent
community of (k) species, will the next stable configuration
to 'vhich this community decays consist of "k"-l species (i.e.
only "i" is lost)? "k"-S ("i" plus 4 others lost)? "k"-IO?
In general, the greater the difference in these adjacent stable
configur-ations r the less likely it is that Restoratbre
Resilience adaptations of the system as a whole will be able
to reestablish species lost to local extinctions in a ｲ･ｾｳｯｮ｡｢ｬｹ
short time. The similarity of adjacent stable configurations
in state space is one view of what we have called Contingency
Resilience.
Note that although the development above is cast in terms
of species removals, the concept holds as well for species
introductions such as those being carried out by Group I and
dealt with in the "invasions" literature. In both cases, the
ultimate point of interest is the similarity of adjacent
stable regions in the overall (here "k" * introduced species)
- 18 -
state space. We shall develop this point in more detail in
our final report.
Contingency Resilience, viewed in the manner described
above, is what the sensible fraction of the eterne1 diversity-
stability arguments are about •. Both Elton (1966) in his
empirical studies and It1acArthur (1955) in his theoretical 1:'lOrk
saw diversity as essentially Eermissive, e.g. more species
could allow more alternative food sources and thus less
sensitivity of the community as a whole to changes in, or
removal of, one of its members. Whether ｾ ｮ ､ to what extent
this potential (contingency) resilience inherent in high
species diversity is in fact realized is a matter to be deter-
mined in each particular instance.
The theoretical literature in the diversity/comp1exity/
stability area is generally quite useless for our purposes,
as it tends to deal on the one hand with randomly connected
webs of species (which real communities most emphatically are
not)and on the other hand with a "stability" criterion \'lhich
does not distinguish between two and twenty additional species
going eJc.tinct as the reuul t of a perturbation. Since this
difference is precisely what is important in terms of resilience,
persistence, and overall perturbation response, we are begin-
ning from square one in our, efforts to quantify and formalize
the Contingency Component of resilience.
Summary
We are by no means convinced that the present Components
of Resilience scheme will lead to a satisfactory ｦ ｲ ｡ ｭ ･ ｾ ｯ ｲ ｫ for
the analysis of distuI'.bed ecosystem: behavior. A good deal
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more theoretical work must be done, of course, but the
meaningful test can only corne as we try to relate ｾ ｨ ･ Components
ideas to the emerging results of the field studies. Only to
the extent that the overview aids in our interpretation and
interrelation of these results will it have served a useful
purpose. We remain convinced, however, of the need for some
sort of ｦ ｲ ｡ ｭ ･ ｷ ｯ ｲ ｝ ｾ which allows us explicitly to distinguish
and relate the various aspects of disturbed ecosystem behavior
alluded to above and in the contemporary stnbility/diversity/
resilience literature. Such a framework has not, in our view,
been available and this is sufficient justification for the
preliminary work reported here.
D). A Sampler of Examples.
We present below, in no particular order, a varied sample
of design and ｭ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｧ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ problems which have served to
illuminate the Components ideas.
* Internal Organization of the Firm
Cyert & rlarch (1963) provide a particularly illuminating
example of restorative resilience in their classic Theory of
the Firm. They speak at length of the concept of ｯ ｲ ｧ ｾ ｮ ｩ ｺ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｬ
slack; lithe difference between total resources and total ｮ ｾ ｣ ･ ｳ ﾭ
sary ｰ ｡ ｹ Ｎ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ ｳ ｾ Ｌ i.e. uncommitted capital. They continue, ｮ ｭ ｾ ｮ ｹ
interesting phenomena within the firm occur because slack is
typically not zero •••• (Slack) seems to be useful in dealing
with the adjustment of firms to gross shifts in the e2cternal
environment •• ｾ Ｎ When the environment becomes less favorable,
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organizational slack represents a cushion ••••• (permitting)
firms to survive in the face of adversity ••••• (It) absorbs
a substantial share of the potential variability in the firm's
environment ••••• (playing) both a stabilizing and adaptive
role" (pp 36 - 38). And they conclude on a note which should
be comforting to those nervous, about an incipient teleology
in our re!?ilience notions: "This is not to argue that slack
is deliberately created for such a stabilizing purpose: in
fact, it is not. Slack arises from the bargaining and decision
process we have described, without conscious intent on the
part of the coalition members to provide stability to the
organization. In a sense, the process is reinforced because
it "works" and it "works" partly because it generates slack,
but we have seen no significant evidence for the conscious
rationalization of slack in business firms" (pg. 38).
* The DC-IO Aircraft Disaster.
This example is drawn from a recent article in the Wall Street
Journal (3 March, 1975; pg.l,9). The DC-lO disasters occurred
when the main lower hold cargo door blew open at altitude.
The lower hold depressurized very rapidly but probably without
immediate disasterous consequences. The crash seems to have
.occurred because, following decompression of the hold, the
passenger cabin floor immediately assumed the function of a
pressure bulkhead, separating the pressurized cabin from the
depressurized hold. A decision had been made not to reinforce
the floor to enable it to withstand such stress, and as a result
the floor collapsed pulling several seats from the aircraft and
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and leading to decompression of the passenger cabin. This would
have been bad enough, but all of the control cables for the
aircraft had been laid along the floor and were consequently
severed or fouled when the floor buckled. As a result, the
plane crashed. The telling part of the WSJ article was that the
disaster scenario had been predicted during design phase and
confirmed in early experience with the DC-la, but the recommended
"safe-failure" solutions were ignored in favour of an ad hoc
fail-safe one which did, ultimately, fail.
Early studies showed that if the cargo hold were suddenly
".,
depressurized at altitude, and the floor forced to serve as a
bulkhead, the latter would buckle. Possible safe-fail solutions
were to strengthen the floor to a stage where it could serve
as a bulkhead, and/or to vent the floor sufficiently so that
the passenger cabin could depressurize relatively harmlessly
through the vents into the hold. Some vents were in fact
installed in the DC-IO but these were knm·,m to be insufficient
for coping with rapid and total decompression of the hold at
flight altitudes. (It is interesting to note in passing that the
recent crash of a CSA ferrying children out of Vietnam also
involved a cargo door blow-out and rapid depressurization of
the hold. The passenger cabin ｾ ｬ ｯ ｯ ｲ did not collapse however,
and news reports made specific mention of the fact that sufficient
venting had been built into the floor to allow pressures to be
equalized without breaking the floor. This connects back to a
reference in the WSJ·' article in which an engineer urged civil
aircraft designers to adopt the military's design system of
- 22
presumed failure rather than their present one of meeting
standards). Instead of adopting either of the available safe-
failure solutions, Douglas chose to install a fail-safe device
on the cargo door which would guarantee its proper latching,
thus "eliminating" the possibility of blowout. The fail-safe
device was crude to begin with and, predictably, failed.
The lesson here is clearly one of designing to live with
failure by having alternatives - i.e. a traditional Class III
or Contingent adaptation. We were worried at first by the
obvious parallels here to a Toes-sort of Class I (see below)
where we were changing boundaries by installing vents. The
resolution of that ambiguity turned out to be straightforward
however, and related to what level of "system" we are considering
for the aircraft as a whole. We might manage to think of (say)
the venting solution as one which expanded the boundaries -
i.e. increased the field of conditions in which the system
"aircraft" would survive, by including the condition (state-
space description) of hold decompression within those boundaries.
But we can also look at the problem as one composed of II cabin
integrityll,"hold integrityll, and so on which have simply been
uncoupled from each other by the venting. That is, the floor
is still incapable of with-standing the forces which would
impringe on it as a pressure bulkhead. But the venting provides
that it will never be called upon to serve as a pressure
bulkhead, at least in the event of hold depressurization. My
guess is that we will encounter many potentially confusing
situations of this sort, all of which will depend for resolution
on a clear and precise definition of just what the II system" is
we are considering in our state space.
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ｾ Flooding and Hurricane Agnes
This example is due to P-iering (personal' communication) as a
result of Hurrican Agnes, the Susquahana River overflowed,
causing substantial damage. This was of two sorts; the ､ ｯ ｴ ｾ Ｍ
stream delta and valley inundations, and the upstream/tributary
flash floods. Because of the area involved, the ､ ｯ ｾ ｭ ｳ ｴ ｲ ･ ｡ ｭ
inundations were responsible for the largest dollar damage
by far. But the upstream flash floods were responsible for
the greatest loss of life. It is clear that there are two
different "surprise" situations to ｡ ､ ｾ ｰ ｴ to here. In the
downstream areas, a graded hierarchy of adaptations can be
observed. Levees have been built to reduce possibility of
failure. Sandbag and other facilities are available for
.-
adaptive, real-time response to rising waters (all Class I).
Many of the permanent structures such as roads and power
transmission facilities have been "flood-proofed" to a
certain degree 50 that they will be functional when the waters
recede.This would seem a Class I adaptation, extending
boundaries so thatt your system "transportation x water level"
can tolerate high water levels without flipping into a state
of permanent "no transportation" But it is also a Class III,
where you have disconnected transport and water level so that
the performance of the former is essentially independent of
failure to control the latter. Again note here the ClassI/Class III
confusion, resolved by carefully defining which system you
are talking about. There are no a priori reasons for choosing
either - i.e. the transport/water, or transport alone - and
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our guess is· that the criteria in any given instance will be
ones of convenience and engineering relevance. An additional
adaptation is flood insurance and disaster reliefs both
clearly Class II adaptations.
Finally, there is the Civil Defence warning and evacuation
program which gets people out of the area when a flood is
imminent. We are confused here, but think Class II is appropriate.
We usually think of II as having several sets of resources,
some of which the disaster does not strike. Here we are invoking
the "external" character of Class II adaptations to get people
where the disaster is not). Note that this last set of evacuation
adaptations works only because the onset of the surprise is
slow enough to allow the warning and evacuation to be carried
out. Also,many of the great valley floods are of such a low
"local intensity" that people can survive on rooftops for quite
a while to allow the evacuation to catch up to them. This is
precisely not the case in upper reaches of river and tributaries
where flash floods occur. These cannot be prevented as the
milage of levee would be absurbly prohibitive. They cannot be
reacted to with sandbagging because of the many areas over
which tremendous changes in water height occur almost instantly.
The problem of high intensity impact means that anyoody still
around where a flash flood occurs is likely to be dead. Because
of the speed and intensity of onset, the only viable adaptation
seem to be a risk warning when there is a possibility of heavy
rains (this, historically, will be ignored), and a Class II
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program of insurance. A final alt rnative would be to eliminate
any settlement in the flash flood-prone areas.
ｾ ｔ ｨ ･ Toes Island Hydro Project
This again, is due to Fiering (personql communication). The
Toes Island proposal concerns dam and reservoir project, which
is being justified as a drought protection measure. The drought
in question is the one in the early 1960's which seriously
affected supplies throughout the north eastern United States.
In this case, New York City (NYC) drew water from its upstream
impoundments and would not release water to supplement the low
flow of the Delaware. The estuary salt wedge began to creep
upstream at a slow but distinct pace,approaching the freshwater
intakes for the city of Philadelphia.
Actual response was a graded series of measures to force
NYC to supplement Delaware flow. They finally agreed to do so
but only on. an experimental basis to see if a low release would
stabilize the salt ''I1'edge a "safe" distance belmrl the ｩ ｮ ｴ ｡ ｾ ｾ ｣ Ｓ Ｎ
In this case the release accomplished its goal.
Proponants of Toes argue that we need to assure that such
a situation will never again arise, since "ne)ct time" the ,-,edge
might not be stopped so easily.Those opposed ｣ ｯ ｾ ｮ ｴ ･ ｲ with a pair
of observations. First of all, droughts of the magnitude
necessary to create the wedge problem would seem to be extremely
rare. Secondly, even in the previous case, a graded series of
responses were available which could have salvaged the situation
even had it grown worse. The National Guard could have forced
NYC to honour their commitment to supplement low flows. New York
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could have switched its water intake completely to the Hudson
using desalinization techniques, releasing all impoundments
for wedge control. The Corps of Engineers was prepared to
extend the Philadelphia intakes upstream as far as necessary
to keep ahead of the wedge. And so on •.. The point here is
not whether Toes should or should not be built; it might be
quite justifiable on, say, recreational grounds. Rather,the
important realization is that there are two extreme ways of
copi.ng with the drought threat. One is to redesign the entire
system so as to guarantee (ahem.•• ) sufficient flow via the
Toes impoundment. The other is to design for a fleJdble
response to the rare drought/low flow threat by providing for
(e. g.) ,the rapid erection of desalination and intake extension
capabilities.
This example illustrates a neglected aspect of Class I
res lienee. In exchanging control over a known problem for
flexibility of response we are shifting from an equilibrium
to a boundary view. Again we have an instance of dynamic
boundaries and an ability to shift them at will, if temporar.ily.
This approach we compare to one in which we are saddled with
a massive, permanent, static "solution" to a problem \'lThich
in fact may never occur. Note however that the flexibility
option arises only because of the relatively slow rate at which
the wedge moved upstream and our accurate ability to monitor
its position. Given a faster potential onset or a more ambiguous
monitoring capability, we would have to consider only very
fast sorts of flexibilities, or provide for surviving during
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a period of time when the wedge did in fact override the
intakes via Class II adaptations.
P Additional Material
A growing body of "Disaster" studies is available, docu-
menting the ways in which various societies organize to cope
with stress (see R. Kates, 1973. Science 182: 981 - 990 and
G. White (cd.), The environment as hazard) Velimirovic's study
(IIASA l<\TP - 74 -36) of primitive cul-tures should be consulted
for a number of ingenious Class I and Class II resilience
examples.
Even a cursory look at the reactions of large _business
concerns to the recession of the late 1960's is sufficient to
illustrate the existence and effect of Class II and Class III
adaptations. The almost universal response of the hard hit
aerospace industry, for example, has been to diversify its
product lines, control practices and markers. In a ｰ｡ｲｾｬｬ･ｬ
move, former "aerospace" cities like Seattle have gone to
great lengths to diversify the assemblage of businesses which
form their tax and ･ ｭ ｰ ｬ ｯ ｬ ｾ ･ ｮ ｴ bases (Classic Class III).
Raiffa (personal communic"ation) tells us that-eCach of our Resil-
ience Components has parallels in business management theory.
Finally, no review of applied resilient design would be
complete without at least passing reference to the literature
of military history and strategy. Whether comparing the Army
of the Potomac with that of the Confederated States, or NelsonDs
navy with that of ｂ ｯ ｮ ｡ ｰ ｡ ｲ ｾ ･ Ｌ the clear superiority of adaptive
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(Class I), semi-autonomous (Class II), diversely supplied
(Class III) organization is obvious for circumstances where
uncertainty and surprise are the order of the day.
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